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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Timothy Lynn Friel timely appeals from the district court's order denying his
motion to withdraw his probation violation admission. On appeal, Mr. Friel argues that
the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to withdraw his
probation violation admission.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Friel was indicted for "statutory" rape. (40755 R., pp.10-12.) 1 Pursuant to a
plea agreement, Mr. Friel pleaded guilty to rape.

(40755 R., pp.16-17, 26-27.)

Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified sentence of eight years, with two years
fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (40755 R., pp.26-28.) Upon review of Mr. Friel's period
of retained jurisdiction (hereinafter, rider), the district court suspended the sentence and
placed Mr. Friel on probation. (40755 R., pp.35-38.)
After a period of probation, the State filed a motion for probation violation alleging
that Mr. Friel had violated the terms of his probation. (40755 R., pp.65-66.) Mr. Friel
admitted to violating the terms of his probation by committing the misdemeanor crime of
trespass and consuming alcohol on multiple occasions. (40755 R., pp.66-67, 78.) The
district court revoked and reinstated Mr. Friel's probation. (40755 R., pp.85-86.)

Mr. Friel previously filed an appeal in this matter, Idaho Supreme Court docket number
40755, and the Idaho Supreme Court took judicial notice of the Reporter's Transcript
and the Clerk's Record from that appeal and ordered a limited Clerk's Record and
Reporter's Transcript be created for the instant appeal. (R., p.2.) Accordingly, all
citations in this brief to the record from the prior appeal will begin with a reference to the
docket number, 40755, from that appeal.
1

1

filed a motion for a bench warrant

After a second period of probation,
for a probation violation alleging that Mr.

violated the terms of his probation.

(40755 R., pp.165-167.) Mr. Friel admitted to violating the terms of his probation by
failing to complete sex offender treatment. (40755 R., pp.165-167, 262.) The district
court revoked probation, but retained jurisdiction. (40755 R., pp.275-276.) Upon review
of Mr. Friel's second "rider," the district court relinquished jurisdiction.

(40755

R., pp.282-283.) Mr. Friel then filed a Rule 35 motion requesting leniency, which was
denied by the district court.

(40755 R., pp.290-291; R., pp.38-40.)

Mr. Friel timely

appealed from the district court's order relinquishing jurisdiction. 2 (40755 R., pp.285287.)
While that appeal was pending, Mr. Friel then filed a motion to withdraw his most
recent probation violation admission. 3

(R., pp.111-112.)

In support of that motion,

Mr. Friel argued that his probation violation, failing to complete sex offender treatment,
was not willfully committed, and the district court erred when it revoked his probation
because of a recent amendment to I.C.R. 33(e), which provides that, "The court shall
not revoke probation unless there is an admission by the defendant or a finding by the
court, following a hearing, that the defendant willfully violated a condition of probation."
(R., pp.111-112, 115-122.)
The district court denied Mr. Friel's motion to withdraw his probation violation,
ruling that the foregoing sentence in I.C.R 33(e) only required that the admission itself,
as opposed to the underlying conduct which provided a basis for the admission, was

2

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order relinquishing jurisdiction in the
rrior appeal. State v. Friel, 2014 Unpublished Opinion No.547 (Ct. App. June 4, 2014).
Mr. Friel also filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, which was subsequently
withdrawn from the district court's consideration. (R., pp.41-48, 113-114.)
2

willfully made by Mr. Friel at the probation violation admission hearing.
179.) In other

(R., pp.178-

the district court ruled that the applicable language

I.C.R. 33(e)

prevents the revocation of probation when the admission was coerced.

(R., pp.178-

179.)

The district court also ruled that even if it was misinterpreting l.C.R. 33(e),

Mr. Friel willfully engaged in the conduct which provided the basis for his probation
violation. (R., pp.179-181.) The district court then ruled that it could revoke probation
even if the underlying conduct was not willfully committed by Mr. Friel, as long as it
considered the alternatives to incarceration prior to revoking probation.

(R., pp.181-

183.) Mr. Friel timely appealed from the district court's order denying his motion to
withdraw his probation violation admission. (R., pp.187-190.)

3

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr.
his probation violation admission?

4

motion

withdraw

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Friel's Motion To Withdraw
His Probation Violation Admission
Motions for withdrawal of pleas are governed by I.C.R. 33(c). 4 Whether to grant
a motion to withdraw a guilty plea lies in the discretion of the district court and such
discretion should be liberally applied. State v. Freeman, 110 Idaho 117, 121 (Ct. App.
1986).

After a defendant has been sentenced, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea

generally will be granted only to correct a manifest injustice. Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c);

Due to undersigned counsel's duty of candor to this tribunal, I.R.P.C. 3.3, this Court
must be informed that in State v. Fleshman, 144 Idaho 772 (Ct. App. 2007), the Idaho
Court of Appeals held that I.C.R. 33(c) does not allow a trial court to withdraw a
probationer's probation violation admissions and set aside an order revoking probation.
Even assuming I.C.R. 33(c) empowers a district court to withdraw a probationer's
probation violation admissions and set aside an order revoking probation, the district
court had no jurisdiction over the order revoking probation at the time Mr. Friel moved to
withdraw his probation violation admissions, because Mr. Friel did not file an appeal
from the order revoking probation. The order revoking Mr. Friel's probation was filed on
September 17, 2012 (40755 R., pp.275-277), that order became final on October 29,
2012, which was forty-two days from the entry of the order revoking probation. I.A.R.
14(a). Mr. Friel's motion to withdraw his probation violation was filed on December 4,
2013 (R., pp.111-112), which was over a year after the district court lost jurisdiction over
the order revoking probation. See State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352 (2003).
From a cursory review of I.AR. 14(a), one might posit that Mr. Friel's first notice
of appeal, which was timely filed from the order relinquishing jurisdiction (40755
R., pp.285-287), enlarged the time to appeal from the prior order revoking probation.
The applicable portion of I.A.R. 14(a) provides:
4

If, at the time of judgment, the district court retains jurisdiction pursuant to
Idaho Code § 19-2601 (4 ), the length of time to file an appeal from the
sentence contained in the criminal judgment shall be enlarged by the
length of time between entry of the judgment of conviction and entry of the
order relinquishing jurisdiction or placing the defendant on probation;
provided, however, that all other appeals challenging the judgment must
be brought within 42 days of that judgment.
I.A.R. 14(a). In State v. Thomas, 146 Idaho 592 (2008), the Idaho Supreme Court held
that the use of the word "judgment" in I.A.R. 14(a), means the original judgment not an
order revoking probation. So only when a rider is ordered after the entry of the original
judgment, is the to time appeal from the sentence contained in the original judgment
enlarged during the period of retained jurisdiction.
5

v. Huffman, 137 Idaho 886, 887 (Ct App. 2002); State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho

358, 361 (Ct. App. 1997). It is the defendant's burden to show that a manifest injustice
would result if the motion to withdraw the guilty plea were denied. State v. Gomez, 124
Idaho 177, 178 (Ct. App. 1993). Manifest injustice will be found if the plea was not
taken in compliance with constitutional due process standards, which require that a
guilty plea be entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Huffman, 137 Idaho at
887; Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
Mindful of the fact that I.C.R. 33(c) does not allow a probationer to withdraw a
probation violation admission, and mindful of the fact that this Court does not have
jurisdiction over this appeal, see note 1 supra, Mr. Friel still argues that the district court
erred when it denied his motion to withdraw his probation violation admission. Mr. Friel
argues that his probation violation admission was not made knowingly and intelligently
because he was unaware of the implications of entering a non-willful probation
admission. (R., pp.11-112, 115-122.) On July 1, 2012, Idaho Criminal Rule 33(e) was
amended to add an intent element, which prevents a district court from revoking
probation without first finding that the underlying conduct, which formed the basis for the
probation violation, was willfully committed by the probationer. The applicable language
of I.C.R. 33(e) provides, "The court shall not revoke probation unless there is an
admission by the defendant or a finding by the court, following a hearing, that the
defendant willfully violated a condition of probation."

I.C.R. 33(e).

Based on that

language, which was applicable at the time of Mr. Friel's September 11, 2012, probation
violation admission hearing (40755 R., pp.165-167), he argues that he should be able to
withdraw his probation violation admission to correct a manifest injustice because his

6

admitted probation violation was not willfully committed and, therefore, I.C.R. 33(e)
the district court from revoking his probation
The district court rejected Mr. Friel's argument because it interpreted the
applicable language of I.C.R. 33(e) to mean that probation could not be revoked unless
the probationer's admission was willfully made before the district court.

(R., pp.178-

179.) In other words, the district court ruled that I.C.R. 33(e) was amended to prevent
probation from being revoked when the probationer is forced or otherwise coerced into
admitting a probation violation. The district court's interpretation of I.C.R. 33(e) is not
consistent with the plain language of the Rule, as the word "willfully" modifies the phrase
"violated a condition of probation."

I.C.R.33(e).

This phrase can only have one

meaning, which is that the probationer must have willfully violated a condition of
probation in order for the district court to revoke probation.

The district court's

interpretation of I.C.R. 33(e) would only be correct if the sentence was reformatted and
the word "willfully" was removed from its current position and placed immediately before
the phrase "admission by the defendant or finding by the court." For example, "The
court shall not revoke probation unless there is a willful admission by the defendant or
finding by the court, that the defendant violated a condition of probation." As such, the
district court's interpretation of I.C.R. 33(e) is not consistent with the plain language of
that Rule.
The district court also held, assuming that Mr. Friel's probation violation was not
willfully committed, that it only needed to consider the alternatives to prison before it
revoked probation. (R., pp.181-183.) The district court correctly stated the applicable
rule controlling non-willful probation violations which existed prior to the 2012
amendment to I.C.R. 33(e). See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983); see also
7

State v. Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378 (Ct. App. 1994 ). However, the Idaho Supreme Court

was aware of this case law and intentionally abrogated it when the Court adopted the
2012 amendment to I.C.R. 33(e). See Druffe/1 v. State Dept. of Transp., 136 Idaho 853,
856 (2002) ("Statutes are construed under the assumption that the legislature was
aware of all other statutes and legal precedence at the time the statute was passed.");
see also Obendorf v. Terra Hug Spray Co., 145 Idaho 892, 900 (2008) ("We have, in the

past, applied rules of statutory construction in the interpretation of our rules of civil
procedure."). There would have been no need for the 2012 amendment to I.C.R. 33(e),
if the purpose of that amendment was

to allow the continued application of the holding

from Bearden and Lafferty. Clearly, the Idaho Supreme Court was aware of Bearden
and Lafferty when it amended I.C.R. 33(e). As such, the district court's reliance on legal
precedents which was undermined by the 2012 amendment to I.C.R. 33(e) was
misplaced.
The district court also ruled that Mr. Friel voluntarily violated his probation by
failing to complete out-patient sex-offender treatment. (R., pp.179-181.) Mr. Friel still
contends that he did not willfully fail to complete his treatment, and that his slow
progress in that programming was due to a traumatic brain injury, which inhibited his
ability to progress through that programming at a faster rate.

(R., pp., 115-122;

Tr., p.10, L.12 - p.28, L.20.)
In sum, Mr. Friel did not willfully violate the terms of his probation and the district
court erred when it ruled that the 2012 amendment to I.C.R. 33(e), still allows Idaho
courts to revoke probation when the underlying conduct, which served as the basis for
the probation violation, was not willfully committed by the probationer. It follows that the
district court also erred when it denied Mr. Friel's motion to withdraw his probation
8

violation admission

he established that his

was not entered knowingly and

intelligently, which constitutes a manifest injustice.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Friel respectfully requests that this matter be remanded for further
proceedings.
DATED this 6 th day of November, 2014.

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

9

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 6 th day of
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANTS BRI
thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
TIMOTHY FRIEL
INMATE #63689
ICIO
381 W HOSPITAL DRIVE
OROFINO ID 83544
TIM HANSEN
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
RANDALL BARNUM
ATTORNEY AT LAW
E-MAILED BRI
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
PO BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720-0010
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court.

EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
SFW/eas

10

